By Richard Okuku
In a recent opinion article titled “Let’s Appoint, Train New RDCs and Chief Administrative Officers,” published on September 28, 2026, Hon. Moses Byaruhanga, Senior Presidential Advisor on Political Affairs, called for the appointment and training of a new generation of Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs), Deputy CAOs, Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) and Deputy RDCs.
His argument is premised on concerns about corruption, administrative laxity, staff absenteeism and weaknesses in public service delivery at the local government level. These concerns are legitimate and deserve urgent attention. However, the critical question is whether replacing administrative leaders, without addressing the structural challenges within which they operate, would deliver the desired improvements.
Uganda’s decentralisation framework is complex. Local governments are responsible for delivering essential public services, implementing national policies and responding to the needs of local communities. Yet their performance is influenced by fiscal constraints, staffing limitations, centrally controlled administrative procedures and institutional bottlenecks that individual officers cannot resolve independently.
Consequently, while leadership accountability remains essential, replacing CAOs and RDCs without reforming the systems that constrain their performance risks treating the symptoms rather than the causes of administrative inefficiency.
This article examines the historical foundations of decentralisation, the operational realities facing local governments and the reforms required to improve accountability and service delivery sustainably.
Decentralisation: The constitutional and institutional foundation
Uganda’s decentralisation framework is anchored in Chapter Eleven of the 1995 Constitution and operationalised through the Local Governments Act. Its fundamental objective is to transfer administrative, political and fiscal responsibilities closer to the people, strengthen local democracy and improve the delivery of public services.
The system rests on three interconnected pillars: political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation.
Political decentralisation empowers elected local councils to make decisions that reflect the priorities and aspirations of their communities. Administrative decentralisation assigns public servants, led by CAOs in districts and Town Clerks in urban authorities, the responsibility of implementing council decisions, managing public resources and executing government policies. Fiscal decentralisation provides the financial resources necessary for local governments to fulfil their statutory mandates through intergovernmental transfers and locally generated revenue.
These pillars are interdependent. Elected leaders cannot effectively implement development priorities without adequate resources, while technical administrators cannot deliver results if they lack the staffing, operational funding and institutional authority required to perform their duties.
Similarly, financial allocations alone cannot guarantee better services without competent leadership, effective supervision and accountability.
The debate about replacing CAOs and RDCs must therefore be situated within this broader institutional framework. The central question is not simply whether individual officers are performing, but whether the systems within which they operate provide the necessary conditions for effective performance.
The fiscal reality: Responsibilities without adequate resources
One of the most significant constraints facing local governments is the mismatch between their statutory responsibilities and the financial resources available to discharge them.
Districts and urban authorities are expected to support primary education, deliver basic healthcare, maintain local roads, supervise public infrastructure projects, provide agricultural extension services and coordinate community development programmes. These responsibilities require predictable funding for salaries, operational activities and development expenditure.
However, local government financing remains heavily dependent on central government transfers, many of which are earmarked for specific purposes. Wage grants cover approved staff salaries, while conditional development grants are restricted to designated programmes and expenditure categories.
This leaves many local governments with limited discretionary resources to finance routine supervision, monitoring, vehicle maintenance, fuel, stationery, data collection and other essential operational activities.
The result is a persistent implementation gap. A district may have a fully functional education department on paper but lack the transport facilitation required to inspect schools regularly. A district health officer may be accountable for health facility performance without sufficient resources to conduct support supervision, verify staff attendance or follow up on medicine stock-outs.
Under such circumstances, poor service delivery cannot automatically be attributed to administrative negligence. In some instances, it reflects a system that assigns responsibilities without providing adequate operational capacity.
Discussions about the proportion of the national budget allocated to local governments should therefore be informed by the actual cost of delivering decentralised services. Rather than relying on an unverified universal percentage as the appropriate benchmark, government should assess the resources required to meet statutory service delivery standards and progressively align transfers with those requirements.
The fundamental principle is straightforward: accountability must be accompanied by the resources and authority necessary to deliver results.
Operational underfunding weakens supervision and accountability
Inadequate operational funding has direct consequences for the quality of public services and the effectiveness of administrative oversight.
Consider the construction of a classroom block in a remote sub-county. The district engineering department must inspect the site at different stages to verify foundation depth, construction materials, workmanship and compliance with approved specifications before certifying completed works.
Where the department lacks fuel, transport or adequate facilitation, site inspections may become irregular. Construction defects may go undetected, contractors may exploit weak supervision, and public funds may be exposed to waste.
The same challenge affects schools and health facilities. Regular inspections are necessary to identify teacher absenteeism, verify records, assess the availability of essential supplies and ensure compliance with service delivery standards.
Without the resources to conduct these activities consistently, enforcement becomes difficult. Problems that could have been identified and corrected early may persist until they develop into more serious failures.
This does not absolve CAOs, Town Clerks or other responsible officers of their obligations. Rather, it underscores the need to distinguish between negligence, which warrants disciplinary action, and institutional incapacity, which requires administrative and fiscal reform.
Effective oversight must be adequately funded, regularly conducted and supported by clear consequences for non-compliance.
Procurement delays undermine project implementation
Public procurement is another area in which local government performance is frequently judged without sufficient consideration of the entire implementation process.
Local governments may receive allocations for classrooms, teachers’ houses, maternity wards, health centre upgrades and other infrastructure projects. However, implementation must comply with applicable procurement laws, technical specifications, environmental requirements, financial regulations and grant conditions.
Depending on the project, the preparatory process may involve confirming land ownership, completing designs and bills of quantities, undertaking environmental screening, approving procurement plans and securing the necessary administrative clearances.
Delays at any stage can postpone the award of contracts and the commencement of works. When implementation starts late in the financial year, contractors may struggle to complete projects before the June 30 financial year-end. Some may request contract variations because of changes in material costs, while others may rush construction or fail to complete their obligations on time.
The consequences are felt directly by communities. Learners continue studying in overcrowded classrooms, health workers operate in inadequate facilities, and mothers may lack access to appropriate maternity services.
These failures may be attributed to the local government, yet their causes can involve several institutions and processes beyond the direct control of the accounting officer.
Government should therefore examine the entire procurement and project implementation chain, identify avoidable delays and establish clear timelines for decisions and approvals.
At the same time, local governments must strengthen procurement planning, contract management and project monitoring. Systemic reform and individual accountability should reinforce each other rather than be treated as competing priorities.
Staffing restrictions and the challenge of vacant positions
The availability of qualified personnel is equally important to local government performance.
Many districts and urban authorities have vacancies in critical departments, including education, health, engineering, internal audit, procurement, community development and natural resources management.
An approved staffing structure does not necessarily mean that every position can be filled immediately. Recruitment must comply with established procedures, available wage allocations and applicable public service controls.
Where recruitment clearance or sufficient wage provision is delayed, local governments may struggle to fill vacant positions even when the need is evident.
A district may construct additional classrooms without securing approval and funding to recruit the teachers required to serve the increased enrolment. A health centre may be upgraded but remain short of midwives, laboratory personnel or other essential health workers. An engineering department may be expected to supervise roads, buildings and water projects while operating with only a few technical officers.
Such staffing shortages weaken supervision, increase workloads and delay administrative processes.
The appropriate response is to establish transparent and predictable recruitment procedures, align approved staffing structures with available financing and prioritise critical service delivery positions.
Central government ministries responsible for public service management and finance must work more closely with local governments to ensure that staffing decisions reflect genuine service delivery needs.
Universal Primary Education: Funding must match expectations
The debate about school performance illustrates the broader tension between public service obligations and the resources available to meet them.
Concerns about ghost learners, teacher absenteeism and declining educational standards must be addressed firmly. Fraudulent enrolment records undermine public expenditure and divert resources from legitimate beneficiaries. However, efforts to improve accountability must also consider the adequacy of the funding provided to schools.
Using the annual Universal Primary Education capitation rate of UGX 20,000 per learner cited in this article, the allocation translates into approximately UGX 6,667 per learner per term, assuming three school terms annually.
If a school term is assumed to comprise 80 instructional days, this amounts to approximately UGX 83 per learner per day.
This calculation illustrates the financial pressure schools face when expected to support learning materials, examination printing, co-curricular activities, utilities and routine maintenance from limited capitation funding. The actual amount available for each purpose depends on applicable grant guidelines and the school’s expenditure obligations.
The challenge becomes more pronounced where parents and school management committees cannot mobilise supplementary support for essential activities.
Recent restrictions or disputes concerning Parent-Teacher Association contributions have also raised concerns about how schools can meet legitimate operational needs when public funding is insufficient. Such arrangements should be handled transparently and in accordance with applicable government policies, with due consideration for the financial circumstances of parents.
Schools should not be compelled to rely on irregular or unauthorised contributions to compensate for structural funding deficiencies. Equally, any legitimate supplementary support must be managed transparently and without excluding vulnerable learners.
We unequivocally condemn the practice of maintaining ghost learners or manipulating enrolment figures to obtain public funds. Such conduct is fraudulent and must attract appropriate sanctions.
Nevertheless, eliminating fraud and improving educational quality require both rigorous verification and a realistic assessment of the resources schools need to function effectively.
Unspent wage funds: Distinguishing negligence from administrative delays
Another criticism frequently directed at CAOs and Town Clerks concerns the return of unspent wage funds to the Consolidated Fund at the end of the financial year.
While persistent unspent balances may indicate poor planning or weak administrative performance, they should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of negligence.
Recruitment and payroll processes involve several institutions and procedural requirements. A local government may identify vacancies, plan recruitment and make the necessary budget provisions but still face delays in obtaining clearances, completing appointments or processing staff records.
District Service Commissions must undertake recruitment in accordance with applicable procedures, while public service and finance authorities are responsible for relevant approvals, staffing controls and financial processes.
Payroll onboarding through the Human Capital Management system and associated financial management systems may also require verification and resolution of technical or administrative issues before salaries can be processed.
Where recruitment approvals are delayed, a local government may be unable to utilise the wage provision intended for vacant positions within the financial year. Depending on the applicable financial rules, the unspent balance may consequently be returned to the treasury.
These circumstances must be investigated individually. Some unspent balances may result from central administrative delays, while others may arise from inadequate workforce planning, late recruitment action or weak management at the local level.
The solution is not to excuse all unspent funds, but to establish clear accountability for every stage of the process. Ministries, commissions and local governments should document when requests are submitted, when approvals are issued, where delays occur and which institution is responsible for resolving them.
This would make it possible to distinguish genuine administrative failures from delays outside the control of local accounting officers and to apply corrective measures accordingly.
Why replacing CAOs and RDCs alone will not solve the problem
The proposal to replace existing CAOs and RDCs with a new generation of administrators raises important questions about institutional continuity, recruitment criteria and the sustainability of public sector reform.
First, a wholesale replacement risks losing institutional memory. Experienced administrators hold knowledge of local development priorities, ongoing contracts, staffing challenges, financial commitments and the history of administrative decisions. Removing them without a structured transition may disrupt programmes and weaken continuity.
Second, new officers would inherit many of the same constraints. Unless operational funding is improved, recruitment procedures streamlined, wage provisions aligned with staffing needs and procurement delays addressed, incoming administrators may encounter the same difficulties as their predecessors.
Third, an indiscriminate replacement exercise risks confusing individual culpability with institutional weakness. Officers who have engaged in corruption, neglected their duties or persistently failed to meet performance standards should face appropriate disciplinary or legal consequences. However, those who have performed diligently under difficult circumstances should not be penalised merely because the system itself is constrained.
Fourth, the proposal must be considered in the context of Uganda’s decentralised governance framework. Local government institutions have developed over several decades, creating structures for local representation, administrative coordination and the delivery of public services. Reform should strengthen these institutions rather than undermine their continuity or the legitimate participation of elected leaders.
The roles of CAOs and RDCs must also be clearly distinguished. CAOs are accounting officers responsible for the administration and financial management of district local governments within the applicable legal framework. RDCs primarily perform constitutional and statutory functions relating to the coordination of government programmes, monitoring of service delivery and representation of central government interests in districts.
Although their responsibilities may intersect, they are not interchangeable. Any reform must be based on clearly defined mandates, objective performance indicators and appropriate accountability mechanisms.
Ultimately, replacing personnel is justified where evidence demonstrates the need for disciplinary action or where a transparent recruitment process identifies better-qualified candidates. It is not, by itself, a substitute for institutional reform.
A practical pathway to stronger decentralisation
Uganda needs a reform agenda that combines administrative competence with adequate financing, stronger accountability and more efficient central-local government coordination.
The first priority should be to harmonise the administrative systems managed by the Ministry of Public Service, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, and local governments. Recruitment clearances, payroll processing and wage allocations should operate within predictable timelines, supported by effective digital systems and clear responsibility for resolving delays.
Second, intergovernmental fiscal transfers should be reviewed against the actual cost of delivering essential public services. Primary education, basic healthcare, local infrastructure maintenance and routine supervision require adequate operational funding. Grant allocations should progressively reflect service delivery obligations, local conditions and measurable outcomes.
Third, accountability mechanisms should be strengthened across all levels of government. Internal audit departments, local councils, relevant oversight institutions and established disciplinary procedures should be adequately supported to investigate irregularities and enforce compliance. Public officials who engage in corruption or deliberate negligence must face appropriate sanctions, regardless of their rank or institution.
Fourth, professional development should be continuous rather than limited to occasional training exercises associated with new appointments. CAOs, Town Clerks, RDCs and other public officers require regular training in public financial management, procurement, human resource management, digital administration, performance monitoring and ethical leadership.
Fifth, elected local government leaders also need sustained capacity building. District chairpersons and Local Council III leaders, among others, should receive appropriate training in governance, public accountability, planning and ideological orientation through relevant national institutions, including the National Leadership Institute where applicable.
Sixth, government should undertake a transparent assessment of the existing crop of CAOs, Town Clerks and RDCs. Such an assessment should establish clear performance indicators, distinguish individual failures from systemic constraints and identify officers who require further training, redeployment or disciplinary action. Those who perform well should be recognised and supported, while persistent non-performance should attract proportionate consequences.
Finally, decentralisation must be accompanied by stronger institutional cooperation. Local governments should be involved meaningfully in decisions that affect their staffing, funding, procurement and service delivery obligations. Regular engagement between central government ministries, local government associations and elected leaders would help identify bottlenecks before they become chronic administrative failures.
Fix the system, strengthen accountability
Fighting corruption, absenteeism and administrative laxity is essential to Uganda’s national development. No public officer should be shielded from accountability because of institutional challenges, and no local government should be allowed to use inadequate funding as a blanket justification for fraud, negligence or poor management.
However, meaningful reform requires a distinction between failures of individual leadership and failures of the systems in which public officers operate.
Replacing CAOs and RDCs without addressing inadequate operational funding, recruitment delays, staffing restrictions, procurement bottlenecks and weaknesses in central-local coordination risks reproducing the same problems under different officeholders.
The objective should therefore be to build a decentralised system in which public officials have the competence, resources and authority necessary to perform their duties, while remaining subject to transparent and enforceable accountability.
Uganda does not simply need a new crop of administrators. It needs stronger institutions, predictable financing, efficient administrative processes and a performance management system that rewards competence and sanctions misconduct.
The real test of decentralisation reform is not how many officers are replaced, but whether citizens experience better schools, more reliable healthcare, improved local infrastructure and more responsive public services.
The author is the Secretary General of the Uganda Local Governments Association (ULGA).
